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RECENT DECISIONS

EQUITY-LACHES AND ESTOPPEL AS BARRING EQUITABLE RELIEF IN
PROTECTION OF AN EASEMENT-Grantors- had conveyed to plaintiff a certain
lot in a subdivision with a.provision "leaving a street sixty feet wide between
Block Five • • • and the • • . tract herein conveyed." A plat of the addition,
showing the street, had also been filed. Subsequently, the grantors conveyed to
the defendant the land theretofore comprising the street. Construction on that
land was begun and seventy-two days later when the building was 40 per cent
completed and represented an expenditure of $2,000, plaintiff filed a suit to
restrain interference with his easement, serving notice thereof on the defendant
the same day. The trial court denied plaintiff an injunction on the ground that
he was estopped by his delay in seeking equitable relief. On appeal, held,
affirmed. Though the easement may be recognized, equitable relief by injunction was properly denied. Hamilton v. Smith, (Ark. 1948) 208 S.W. (2d)
425.
The emphasis on the concept that "equity will lend its aid only to those who
are vigilant in asserting their rights" 1 suggests that the court, in principle if
not in terms, relies upon the bar of !aches. It is of interest to note, however, that
the court speaks of "estoppel" rather than of laches. 2 These concepts are similar in that they are founded on some act of the party against whom the bar is
claimed which has prejudiced the party claiming the bar. The general differentiation is that in !aches the emphasis is on delay; in estoppel, on representation.8 Equitable estoppel is a more formalized concept developed from the
common law estoppel in pais,4 and requires a showing of reasonable reliance 5
on the acts, acquiescence, or silence of the other party. 6 Laches, on the other
hand, is a broader concept appealing to the traditional conscience of the equity
court. 7 The essential elements are thus more general and each case depends
upon its own facts. 8 Though the passage of time is emphasized, that alone will
1

Principal case at 42 7.
Principal case at 42 7. The court may have been influenced to use the term
estoppel rather than }aches because of the statement found in some of the cases that
}aches will not be applied to defeat a strict legal right. 4 PoMEROY, EQUITABLE
REMEDIES, 2d ed., § 1445 ( l 9 l 8), and that doctrine has been specifically applied to
seeking an injunction for the protection of an easement, Galway v. Metropolitan
E.R. Co., 128 N.Y. 132, 28 N.E. 479 (1891); 13 L.R.A. 788 (1891).
8
California Packing Corp. v. Sun-Maid Raisin Growers, (C.C.A. 9th, 1936)
81 F. (2d) 674; In re International Mineral Co., (D.C. Conn. 1915) 222 F. 415.
4
McQuitty v. McQuitty, 332 Mo. 1057, 61 S.W. (2d) 342 (1933); 3 PoMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed.,§ 802 (1941),
5
King v. Knudson, 209 Iowa 1214, 229 N.W. 839 (1930); Wollenberger v.
Hoover, 346 Ill. 5u, 179 N.E. 42 (1931); Whitfield v. Hatch, 235 Ala. 38, 177
s. 1496 (1937).
·
Silence or acquiescence may constitute a representation sufficient to raise estoppel
when there is a duty to speak. Pettit-Galloway Co. v. Womack, 167 Ark. 356, 268
S.W. 353 (1925); Sherlock v. Greaves, 106 Mont. 206, 76 P. (2d) 87 (1938).
7
Wolpert v. Gripton, 213 Cal. 474, 2 P. (2d) 767 (1931); Gillons v. Shell
Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 600.
8
Cook v. Knight, 106 S.C. 310, 91 S.E. 312 (1917); Burton v. Ryan, 88 Ind.
App. 549, 165 N.E. 260 (1929); Woods v. Saunders, 247 Ala. 492, 25 S. (2d)
141 (1946).
2
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not justify the interposition of the bar.9 Prejudice must be shown; but that
prejudice may result not only from direct reliance as in estoppel, but from the
indirect consequences of the passage of time, such as obscuration of evidence,10
changes in value, 11 and intervention of the rights of third parties. 12 Thus,
!aches being founded on the broad equitable concepts of justice, the courts have
not imposed the limitation of the right to rely.13 In the principal case it is certain
that there was present the prejudice necessary to give rise to the defense of
!aches; and if we may accept the trial court's finding that a delay of seventytwo days was too great,14 the decision is sound. The case stands as a warning,
however, that, in cases involving improper building, large equities can be obtained in so short a time that ~iligence in bringing legal action is imperative.15
Chester Lloyd Jones, S. Ed.

9 Harper v. Harper, 159 Va. 210, 165 S.E. 490 (1932); Turner v. Hunt, (Tex.
Comm. App. ·1938) 116 S.W. (2d) 688; Moseley v. Briggs Realty Co., 320 Mass.
278, 69 N.E. (2d) 7 (1946).
10 Lutyens v. Ahlrich, 308 Ill. 11, 139 N.E. 50 (1923); Evans v. Linck, 280
Mich. 278,273 N.W. 568 (1937); Walker v. Norton, 199 Ark. 593, 135 S.W. (2d)
315 (1940).
11 Byrne Realty Co. v. South Florida Farms Co., 81 Fla. 805, 89 S. 318 (1921);
Horn v. Hull, 169 Ark. 463, 275 S.W. 905 (1925).
12 Carter v. Price, 85 W. Va. 744, 102 S.E. 685 (1920); Langston v. Hughes,
170 Ark. 272, 280 S.W. 374 (1926).
13 Berkey v. St. Paul Nat. Bank, 54 Minn. 448, 56 N.W. 53 (1893). But an
outward recognition of plaintiff's right may constitute an excuse for delay, Browning v.
Browning, 85 W. Va. 46, IOO S.E. 860 (1919); Angeloff v. Smith, 254 Mich. 99,
235 N.W. 823 (1931), or the continuance of wrongful invasion of rights in the face
of protests may result in defendant's failing in his appeal to the conscience of the court.
Pioneer Mining Co. v. Pacific Coal Co., 4 Alaska 463 (1912).
14 Compare the following cases involving injunction against interference with
an easement where it was held that laches did not bar relief: Bacon v. Onset Bay
Grove Assn., 241 Mass. 417, 136 N.E. 813 (1922) (delay of thirty-five days);
Yunkes v. Webb, 339 Ill. 22, 170 N.E. 709 (1930) (delay of five months but little
expenditure involved); Beaudoin v. Sinodinos, 313 Mass. 511, 48 N.E. (2d) 19
(1943) (delay of sixty-four days). See also Manheim v. Urbani, 318 Mich. 552, 28
N.W. (2d) 907 (1947).
15 See Comment, 46 M1cH. L. REv. 654 at 656-657 (1948).

